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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Teton County incorporates by reference the Statement 0f the Case presented

in

Appellant’s Brief. Teton County responds t0 the Burns Plaintiffs’ Statement 0f the Case as
follows:

The Burns

Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that business valuation expert

Richard

S.

Hoffman’s testimony was effectively challenged and Wholly disregarded. (Cross-App. Brief at
27.) In fact, the trial court referred speciﬁcally t0

Mr. Hoffman’s testimony

adopted ﬁndings consistent with Mr. Hoffman’s testimony.

(Id.)

(R., P. 245.)

By contrast,

and

rebuttal expert

Bruce L. Ross made the incredible assertion that a business generating incremental proﬁt should
continue operations where, as here, proﬁts were insufﬁcient to cover debt obligations. (Resp.

Brief at 8-10.) The

trial

court did not adopt any ﬁndings consistent with Mr. Ross’s testimony.

(See R., P. 205-225; R., P. 236-258.)

The Burns
claim. Teton

Plaintiffs repeatedly

imply that Teton County did not contest the damages

County asserted numerous

factual

post-trial brieﬁng. (See, e.g., R., P. 115-123.)

and

legal Challenges t0 the

Teton County challenged

amounts

at trial

and

in

line items at deposition

resulting in pre-trial adjustments t0 the claim. (See Tr., P. 162, L. 15.) Moreover, the trial court

recognized that “Teton County objected t0 any award 0f reliance damages and disputed that any

0f Plaintiffs’ claimed damages were caused by Teton County’s breach 0f the Agreement.

25 1 .) Teton County has not ever consented

t0 the

Burns

Plaintiffs’

claimed damages amount.

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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(R., P.

claimed damages 0r the

The Burns

Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that they

cannot construct the permanent

without an amended t0 the ordinances of Teton County. (Cross—App. Brief at

Burns acknowledged that a competitive plant in Teton County had been
397, L. 18.) Similarly, Burns Concrete could construct
level recessed t0

comply with

The Burns

permanent

At

trial,

Kirk

built “in a hole.” (TL, P.

facility

with the ground

the County’s height restriction.

Plaintiffs assert that the issues related t0 the

Violation, the legal failures

and the

its

9.)

facility

of the Burns

post-trial request for entry

Plaintiffs’

temporary batch plant’s height

attempted assignment 0f the chose in action,

of declaratory judgment are each barred by the “law 0f the

case” doctrine. However, the Burns Plaintiffs have not identiﬁed any error preceding Burns I that

was not

raised in

Burns

of those issues 0n

I,

nor any holding stated in Burns I Which would preclude consideration

this appeal.

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Teton County presents n0 additional issues in response

III.

to Cross—Appellant’s Brief.

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

Teton County claims attorney’s fees 0n appeal pursuant
Developer’s Agreement.

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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t0

paragraph 12(6) 0f the

ARGUMENT

IV.

By focusing 0n the
picture

is

smallest details,

we risk missing the big picture.

important.

Burns Concrete wanted

to

have a batch plant in Teton County

booming construction market. According

to the

Burns

t0 take

2;

Cross—App. Brief at

Burns Holdings purchased property and applied for a zone change

In 2007, the

21-

to allow manufacturing.

to erect a

temporary

facility

While constructing a

facility.

Burns Concrete began operating
crashed in 2009. Burns Concrete lost
at 31-32.)

2,

County effected the requested zone change by the Agreement With Burns Holdings.

The Agreement allowed Burns Holdings
permanent

advantage of a

Teton County “induced” Burns

Plaintiffs,

Holdings t0 buy property and equipment in 2006. (Resp. Brief at
22.)

In this case, the big

its

temporary

facility in

2007. The construction market

money operating the temporary

Burns Concrete voluntarily ceased operating the temporary

Plaintiffs alleged

2010 was based,

and the

trial

facility.

(Cross App. Brief

facility in

2010. The Burns

court found: “Burns Concrete’s decision t0 cease operations in

at least in part,

on the existence of an unfavorable environment

in

Teton

County, created by actions 0f the Teton County Board 0f Commissioners.” (Resp. Brief at

Burns Concrete had not operated the temporary
Teton County asked Burns Concrete

Agreement anticipated

that the

facility for

to cease operations

temporary

facility

over two years When, in 2012,

and remove the temporary

would be

4.)

in place for 18

facility.

months — the duration

allowed for temporary structures under the County’s building code. In Burns Concrete, Inc.
Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d 354 (2016) (Burns

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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this

The

Court held that the

v.

Agreement’sforce majeur provision tolled the 18-month limitation period. To
Concrete has not removed the temporary

The Burns
inducing

it

t0

Plaintiffs’

buy the

Plaintiffs

is

Burns

facility.

sweeping. Burns Holdings blames Teton County for

property. (Cross-App. Brief at 2.) Burns Concrete blames the Teton

County Commissioners
Burns

blame

date,

for creating an unfavorable business environment. (Resp. Brief at 4.)

blame Teton County

for not giving

them an opportunity t0 cure alleged

breaches. (Cross—App. Brief at 10.) Burns Holdings blames Teton County for ordering

remove the temporary

facility.

(Cross—App. Brief at

The

9.)

The Burns

Plaintiffs cite

it

t0

many causes

for

their operational failure.

However,

this is

not an action in

tort.

The Burns

Plaintiffs

inducement 0r intentional interference or defamation.1 This

damages

are

compensatory

-

is

have not claimed fraud in the

an action in contract. Contract

not punitive. Contract damages do not give one party a Windfall to

the other party’s detriment. Contract

damages make the non-breaching party Whole. Contract

damages remedy breach.
Looking, then, to the big picture, what measure of damages Will make the Burns
Plaintiffs

whole? The

R., P. 213.)

The

trial

trial

court further found that the temporary facility lost

(R., P. 257.) In the bust

lost

court found multiple causes for the cessation 0f operations. (See,

money While

economy, without any breach or cause, the Burns

money through 2016.

Plaintiffs

it

e.g.,

operated.

would have

(See R., P. 213.) Consistent with Richard Hoffman’s testimony, the

1

Such claims would likely have been barred by the applicable
Idaho Tort Claims Act, Idaho Code Title 6, Chapter 9.

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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statutes

of limitation and/or the

trial

court found that Burns Concrete

Hoffman opined that
152.)

Under these

Thousand Dollars
Dollars

is

the net proﬁt

facts,

amount

Where the Burns

if the contract

punitive.

would have turned a net proﬁt
at the

end 0f 2017 would have been $1 15,602.

Plaintiffs

money than they would have earned

trial

award 0f over One Million

court’s

the Burns Plaintiffs a windfall, awarding

if they

(EX., P.

would have made just over One Hundred

had been performed, the

The judgment gives

in 2017. (R., P. 213.)

them more

had continued operations. The award

overcompensates, accounting for causes beyond contractual breach. Teton County

is

pursuing

appeal to correct this unjust award.

NOW,

t0 the details.

Teton County ﬁrst replies t0 the arguments in section IV. A. 0f

Respondent’s Brief regarding the award 0f reliance damages. Next, Teton County responds to

arguments presented in the Cross-Appellants’ Brief? Issues which have been fully presented or
for

Which no

further response

is

needed are not discussed again

in this brief.

A. The award of reliance damages should be disallowed 0r
reduced t0 prevent an unjust windfall t0 plaintiffs.
In

its

opening

limiting reliance

brief,

damage

Teton County urged

t0 claims

Burns

2

722 P.2d 1062, 1066

(Ct.

t0

is

v.

Yacht Club

inconsistent with a

Respondent’s Brief and in response t0 the Cross-

Appellant’s Brief are combined pursuant t0 Idaho Appellate Rule 35(0).

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

The Burns

App. 1986), cited by the

Court 0f Appeals held that an expectancy interest

Teton County’s arguments in reply

available.

of allowing reliance damages. In Brown

Ltd, 111 Idaho 195, 199,

Plaintiffs, the

Court to follow other jurisdictions in

Where expectation damages are not

Plaintiffs cited three opinions in support

ofCoeur d’Alene,

this

& APPELLANT’S REPLY — Page 5

claim for rescission and remanded with instruction t0 reexamine reliance damages. In Beco
Const. C0., Inc.

cited

v.

Harper Contracting, Inc, 130 Idaho

by the Burns

Plaintiffs, the

4, 9,

936 P.2d 202, 207

(Ct.

Court 0f Appeals upheld reliance damages in the context 0f

rescission. In Silverwing at Sandpoint,

LLC v. Bonner County,

164 Idaho 786, 796-98, 435 P.3d

1106, 1116-18 (2019), the plaintiff pursued expectancy and reliance damages. The
rejected the evidence 0f expectancy

damages

available.

damages

as too speculative,

and

this

The

ﬁrst

two

court

trial

Court rejected reliance

as a matter of law because the defendant fully performed, albeit late. Id.

cases address whether reliance

App. 1997),

None 0f these

damages should be considered Where expectancy damages

cases, Yacht

Club and Beco, are distinguishable because they deal With

contract rescission, rather than contractual breach.

damages 0n other grounds. The

trial

damage

theories can be conﬂated

Court’s

rej ection

are

The

third case, Silverwing, rej ects reliance

court’s analysis in this case

where reliance damages are

shows how

tort

and contract

liberally allowed, despite this

0f tort—type damages in contract disputes. See,

e.g.,

Hummer v.

Evans, 129

Idaho 274, 923 P.2d 981 (1996).
If the trial court’s

award 0f reliance damages

adjusted t0 accurately measure the damages amount.

proper calculation of reliance damages in King
(1965). Arvel

v.

is

not wholly disallowed,

at

should be

The Idaho Supreme Court discussed

the

Beatrice Foods C0., 89 Idaho 52, 402 P.2d 966

King borrowed money to purchase a milk route

included a truck and trailer valued

it

for $9,000. Id. at 55.

$3,800 and the balance for goodwill.

Id.

T0

The purchase

obtain

ﬁnancing, King entered a ﬁve-year agreement With Beatrice Foods t0 deliver milk to

it

for

22¢

per hundred pounds. Id. For two years, King delivered milk t0 Beatrice Foods in cans. Id. at 56.

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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Then, Beatrice Foods dismantled
refused to accept milk in cans.

King sued Beatrice Foods

Id.

its

can

facility

and converted

to

bulk tanks.

King did not have the capacity t0

for breach

0f contract.

Id.

Id.

Beatrice Foods

deliver milk in bulk, and

King claimed reliance damages 0f the

$9,000 paid for the milk route plus anticipated lost proﬁts through the remaining contract term.
Id. at 56-57. Citing

French

Supreme Court

the Idaho

v.

Nabob Silver-Lead Company, 82 Idaho

stated that

an “injured party

may recover the reasonable

he has incurred in anticipation 0f performance.” King, 89 Idaho

measure of reliance damages for breach 0f the

120, 350 P.2d

at 57.

The Court

206 (1960),

expense which

articulated the

partially executed contract. Id. at 59. First, the

Court took the claimed reliance damages ($9,000), and deducted the depreciation and salvage
value 0f the truck and

trailer

(estimated at $3,800) for a balance of $5,200. Id. Then, the Court

gave instruction for remand: “if plaintiff could have earned a proﬁt, over and above his operating
expenses

.

.

.

that proﬁt

however small would have compensated him

in part at least for this

reliance expense.” Id. Accordingly, “if plaintiff can prove such a proﬁt with reasonable certainty,

he would be entitled
if King

t0 a

judgment against defendant

for the

amount

thereof.” Id. In other words,

could prove lost proﬁts of $4,000, then he could recover up to $4,000 0f his claimed

reliance damages. If he could prove lost proﬁts 0f $5,200, then he could recover the full

of his reliance claim. If the King methodology were applied in

this case,

amount

then the Burns Plaintiffs

could recover no more than the lost proﬁts they were able to prove. Richard Hoffman opined that
the Burns Plaintiffs

just $1 15,602

would have earned n0 proﬁt through

by the end of 2017.

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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would have earned

The
temporary

trial

court’s ﬁndings of ﬁnancial loss are inconsistent.

facility lost

P. 213; R., P. 257.)

money while

it

it

was not possible

The ﬁnding of net proﬁt

Hoffman’s opinion testimony. Hoffman testiﬁed

court inexplicably concluded that Teton

245.) Although the

trial

court found that the

that

County

t0 calculate

Burns Concrete’s

only supported by Richard

is

Burns Concrete would have earned a net

proﬁt 0f $1 15,602 by the end 0f 2017. (EX., P. 152.) Despite
trial

trial

operated and would have turned a net proﬁt by 2017. (R.,

Kirk Burns testiﬁed that

future proﬁts. (TL, P. 282, L. 10.)

The

its

ﬁndings 0f loss and proﬁt, the

failed to offset reliance

court adopted the Restatement rule capping

damages

damages.

(R., P.

(R., P. 93-95),

it

did not properly apply the rule t0 effect the cap (see R., P. 245). If properly applied, damages

would be capped

at

n0 recovery

for the period ending in 2016,

and damages would be capped

at

$1 15,602 for the period ending in 2017.

The measure 0f reliance damages should
caused by breach. The

trial

further

be adjusted

t0 exclude

damages not

court’s ﬁndings regarding causation misapply the law. Hull

Giesler, 156 Idaho 765, 774, 331 P.3d 507, 5 16 (2014) (holding that a claimant

amount and causation With reasonable
trial

certainty).

must prove

Rather than linking causation to breach, the

court links causation t0 the formation of the Agreement. (R., P. 246-47.)As grounds for

damages award,
if not for the

the trial court found that “Burns Concrete

Agreement’s existence.” (R,

amount of damages ﬂowed from the

P. 247.)

The

would not have incurred

trial

Moreover, the

trial

the expenses

0f default,

failure to provide

— the ﬁndings of breach.

an

(R., P. 84-

court found: “Burns Concrete’s decision t0 cease operations in 2010

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

its

court did not conclude that any

failure t0 provide notice

opportunity to cure, or the 2012 request t0 cease operations

86.)

v.
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was

based, at least in part, on the existence of an unfavorable environment in Teton County, created

by

actions 0f the Teton

County Board 0f Commissioners.” (Resp. Brief at

4.)

The

identiﬁed a cause of injury unrelated t0 and preceding breach. (R., P. 246-47.)
tying

damages

caused, the

to contract formation, rather than breach,

Teton County

and a conclusion. The Burns

reiterates that the

By incorrectly

injuries otherwise

v.

U.S.,

measure 0f damages requires both a beginning

Plaintiffs’ cited authority stating that pre-contract

only be allowed where “the defendant
Holdings, Inc.

court

court misapplied the law.

trial

Finally,

and by including

trial

52 Fed.

knew 0f such

Cl. 135, 161 (2002).)

expenses should

expenses.” (Resp. Brief at 18 (citing Westfed

The same

authority requires a plaintiff t0

prove “that both the magnitude and type 0f damages were foreseeable.” (Resp. Brief at 19 (citing
Westfeld, 52 Fed. C1. at 6.)) There

new

is

no record evidence

t0 support a

ﬁnding

or foresaw the type of claimed expenses or their amounts. For example,

that

Teton County

many of the pre-

contract expenses involved modiﬁcations to the temporary batch plant t0 allow operation from a

remote location, and there
modiﬁcations or their

damages

is

is

n0 evidence

that

Teton County would have anticipated those

costs. (See EX., P. 2-202.)

the contract date.

The end date

The

for the

earliest point to

damage

begin calculating reliance

calculation should be the date 0f

breach, because, at that point ongoing reliance on a broken promise

is

unreasonable. In King,

discussed above, the claimed reliance damages occurred prior t0 breach

promise was reasonable. In

this case, the trial court did

damages calculation should be adjusted

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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its

the

B. Plaintiffs should not receive double-recovery for revenues.

Teton County urged the

court t0 cap

trial

did not account for proﬁts as urged

damages

by Teton County,

trial

7, EX., P. 103.)

net proﬁts. Although the

facility,

its

claimed

costs. (Id.)

incremental proﬁt by operating the temporary

amount from the judgment award

C.

The

The

trial

trial

t0 prevent

court

Burns Concrete recovered

Deducting the cost 0f sales ($213,053.82), the

court identiﬁed compensation to Burns Concrete 0f $412,142.63

could have used t0 cover

trial

the trial court did account for revenues to

prevent double recovery. While operating the temporary

$625,196.45 in revenues. (Exhibit

at

— Which Burns Concrete

Because Burns Concrete recovered

facility, the trial

this

court appropriately reduced the

double recovery.3

court adequately identiﬁed excluded costs.

court found that the Burns Parties did not meet their burden of proof regarding

$443,95 1 .25 of their claimed expenses. The Burns
7,300 separate line items. (See EX., P. 2-202.)
instructions t0 identify disallowed expenses

However, Teton County asserted numerous
(See, e.g., R., P. 115-123.)

The

trial

On appeal,

by

the Burns Parties repeatedly imply that Teton

Plaintiffs’

line

claimed damages consist 0f over

they request reversal with remand

item and amount.

As

part of their argument,

County did not contest the claimed expenses.

factual

and legal challenges

court recognized that “Teton

t0 the

claimed amounts.

County objected

t0

any award

of reliance damages and disputed that any 0f Plaintiffs’ claimed damages were caused by Teton

3

Teton County maintains that net proﬁts should serve as a cap 0n any damages award, rather
than a reduction from the damages claim. However, t0 the extent this Court does not follow the
mathematical formula adopted in King, discussed above,
of incremental proﬁt t0 prevent double-recovery.

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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at least

uphold the reduction

County’s breach 0f the Agreement.

25 1 .) Like the

(R., P.

expenses by category, for example, arguing that the

Due to

number 0f line

trial

115-123.)

than item

prudent. Requiring a line-by-line analysis

is

The

Teton County analyzed the

court should rej ect claimed attorneys’

items, addressing the claim

fees. (R., P.

the

trial court,

by category rather

would impose an undue burden on

the trial

by the

trial

court correlate to items described in Exhibit 8 With

sufﬁcient speciﬁcity t0 understand the

trial

court’s reasoning

court.

categories identiﬁed

and judgment.

D. The

trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ claim for rescission
because plaintiffs did not restore the status quo ante.

Rescission requires a claimant t0 tender back any beneﬁt received under the contract and
restore the other party t0

its

pre-contract position. Watson

v.

Weick, 141 Idaho 500, 112 P.3d 788

(2005) (upholding denial of rescission Where the claimant did not
restore the status

quo

to the other party); White

v.

make an adequate

tender t0

Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 888, 104 P.3d 356, 362

(2004) (upholding denial 0f rescission Where restoration and remodeling prevented return t0 the
status qua);

Robinson

v.

State

Farm Mut.

Auto. Ins. C0., 137 Idaho 173, 45 P.3d 829 (2001)

(denying rescission as a remedy for misrepresentation where the rescinding party failed to tender

back any beneﬁt received under the contract Within a reasonable time); Weber

Mining

& Reduction

C0., 35 Idaho

1,

203

v.

P. 891 (1921) (holding that rescission

Pend D ’Oreille
was not

appropriate where the rescinding party did not offer t0 place the other party in status quo and

was apparent

that

In Rino

v.

he could

it

not).

Statewide Plumbing

& Heating C0.,

74 Idaho 374, 262 P.2d 1003 (1953),

this

Court recognized that rescission could not be granted 0n conditions Where the status quo could

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF
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not be restored. The parties t0 that action entered an agreement to install a heating system.

Following

partial

performance, the property owner sought rescission. Although the system

components could have been returned, the prior use 0f the system and the beneﬁt of the labor and
materials could not truly be restored. 74 Idaho at 378, 262 P.2d at 1005. Therefore, rescission

was not allowed.
In this case, Teton

County rezoned Burns Holdings’ property

t0 a

manufacturing zone in

2007. The property has never been rezoned. The Burns Plaintiffs have had the beneﬁt 0f the zone

change for over a decade, and
Plaintiffs

now

like the

beneﬁt of heat in Rino,

it

cannot be restored. The Burns

argue that the restoration requirement should be waived because

monetary beneﬁt. However, as demonstrated

in Rina, the requirement

limited t0 monetary beneﬁts. Because the status

it is

not a

0f restoration

quo was not tendered back

t0

is

not

Teton County and

cannot be fully restored to Teton County, rescission was properly denied.

E.

The

trial

“Prejudgment

court properly disallowed prejudgment interest.

interest

should be awarded 0n a claim that

mathematical process.” Beco Const. C0.

202

(Ct.

App. 1997). In

this case,

Inc.

v.

is

by mere

Harper Contracting, Ina, 130 Idaho

4,

936 P.2d

Allen Barger developed the damages claim With assistance

from Kirk Burns and Burns Concrete’s

attorney. (Tr. at 178:5-14.) Barger testiﬁed the

generate the claim from accounting software 0r base
177: 16-178z7.) Barger testiﬁed that

it

it

on standard ﬁnancial

took him a year t0 prepare the claim.

Barger testiﬁed that the presented claim was incomplete, insofar as

Which documentation could not be found.

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

ascertainable

(Tr., P. 74, L. 11.)
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it

he did not

reports. (Tr. at

(Tr. at 178:15-16.)

omitted certain charges for

Moreover, the damages claimed by

12

were reduced by the

the Burns Plaintiffs

ascertainable

trial court.

by Teton County using a mere mathematical

denied prejudgment

Teton County respectfully renews

and caps;

that the claims

rej ect

its

the

trial

court’s

court correctly

request that this Court require expectation damages

Plaintiffs’

damages

t0 require causation, limited

ﬁnding 0f breach; and

were assigned and/or jointly

Court deny the Burns

held. In addition,

rej ect

arguments 0n appeal by afﬁrming the

successful in this appeal, Teton

the trial court’s conclusion

Teton County requests that the

damages, denial or rescission, and disallowance of prejudgment
it is

trial

CONCLUSION

available; clarify the calculation 0f reliance

duration,

process, the

interest.

V.

Where

Because the claimed damages were not

trial

interest.

court’s reduction 0f

Furthermore, insofar as

County requests an award of attorney’s

fees consistent With

paragraph 12(6) 0f the Agreement.
Respectfully submitted on

November 21, 2019.
OFFICE OF THE TETON

COUNTY

PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

/s/ Billie J.

By: Billie

J.

Siddoan
Siddoway

Counselfor Teton County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned

certiﬁes that date set forth below, a true and correct

foregoing was caused to be ﬁled electronically With automated service

Robert B. Burns

rburns@parsonsbehle.com
Parsons Behle & Latimer

800 West Main St Ste 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Fax: 208-562-4901

Dated:

November 2 1 20 1 9.
,

/s/ Billie

CROSS-RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Siddoan
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t0:

copy of the

